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Education, social attitudes and social participation among adults in 
Britain 
Abstract 
A stable finding of research on civic participation is the correlation between overall 
educational attainment and various attributes that are relevant to democracy, such as 
propensity to be active, to vote, and to hold views on important public issues. But 
research since the 1990s has suggested that we should be cautious about this 
inference. The most important question is that raised by the findings of Nie et al. 
(1996) on the USA,  showing that rising overall levels of education, while probably 
making populations more liberal, did not make them more likely to vote. Even that 
conclusion may be too general, because research by, for example, Campbell (2004) 
and Nie and Hillygus (2001) shows that the content and style of an educational course 
is relevant. More problematic still are questions about the nature of the citizens which 
education might help to create: is education democratically desirable because it makes 
people think, or because it makes people socially liberal (which is the general tenor of 
most of the writing on this topic)? The paper therefore asks, using British data, what 
kind of education matters for social attitudes and civic participation by adults? Several 
British data sources are used, mainly the 1958 and 1970 British birth cohorts, the 
British Social Attitudes Survey and the British Household Panel Study. 
Key words 
Civic; social capital; academic; vocational; longitudinal; survey. 
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Education, social attitudes and civic participation among adults in 
Britain 
Introduction 
There has been a very long history of thinking about the connection between 
education and civic values, in which the common conclusion is that education makes 
people more democratically responsible in the sense of taking part in civic groups and 
holding liberal and tolerant views that affirm the value of democracy (Bynner and 
Ashford 1994; Bynner et al. 2003: 353; Cogan and Morris 2001; Denver and Hands 
1990: 264; Egerton 2002a,b; Emler and Frazer 1999; Galston 2001: 219; Glaeser et al. 
2006; Huang et al. 2009: 460; Lauglo and Øia 2006: 34-5, 58-61, 68-77, 78-81; 
Newton 1999: 18; Nie et al. 1996: 3; Niemi and Junn 1998; Zukin et al. 2006: 133-8). 
Such conclusions are summed up by Hall (1999), in his authoritative review of the 
nature and extent of social capital in Britain: ‘it is well-established that each 
additional year of education increases the propensity of an individual to become 
involved in community affairs’. That was continuing in a tradition with such 
distinguished exponents as Thomas Jefferson, who famously wrote of his plan for 
education in Virginia: 
of all the views of this law [for public education] none is more important, none 
more legitimate, than that of rendering the people the safe, as they are the ultimate, 
guardians of their own liberty. 
(Jefferson 1984 [1781-2]: 274) 
The empirical evidence, however, suggests that matters are not straightforward. 
Campbell (2006) notes in his comprehensive review of relevant research that it is not 
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sufficient to suppose that ‘education has a universally positive effect on all forms of 
engagement’ (p. 25). For example, while ‘[a]cross much of the industrialised world, 
education levels have been rising .., political engagement of all sorts has been falling.’ 
(p. 26). Even where education does have effects on civic engagement, the mechanisms 
of its influence are not well understood (p. 27).  
The main recent academic debates on this have made six points ((a) to (f) here):  
(a) The first is that the expansion of higher education will have been particularly likely 
to have made people more civic, because it is often claimed that since higher 
education seeks to encourage critical thinking it will enable its graduates to be better 
able to be critical democrats. The principle is expressed by Gutmann (1987: 173): 
learning how to think carefully and critically about political problems, to articulate 
one’s views and defend them before people with whom one disagrees is a form of 
moral education to which young adults are more receptive [than school children] 
and for which universities are well suited. 
Empirical work investigating this by Egerton (2002a,b), using the young people’s 
panel in the British Household Panel Study, confirmed that there was some evidence 
of effects of the kind that Gutmann suggests, although the strongest influences on 
young people’s propensity to participate in civic ways were from their family and its 
social class context. 
(b) The second point from recent research is that adult learning, even that undertaken 
when people are in their middle age, can lead to their being more engaged in civic 
activities. For example, Bynner et al. (2003) have shown this in detail using the 
National Child Development Study for respondents between ages 33 and 42, and 
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Feinstein and Hammond (2004) show that adult learning strengthens personal social 
capital. Campbell (2006: 32-3 and 108) concludes from his review that further 
research on the civic effects of adult learning is needed. 
(c) These two pieces of research – by Egerton and by Bynner et al. – are quite unusual 
in being not from the USA, which – following the Jeffersonian tradition – is where 
most of the work has been done. The third point, from there, is that education might 
have more of an effect on attitudes than on participation. The best-known research on 
that point is by Nie et al. (1996), who concluded that education does encourage people 
to become ‘democratically enlightened’, but does not necessarily encourage them to 
participate. Much participation is like competition for a scarce resource: there is not 
space for everyone to participate; therefore participation will be taken up only by 
those who have the most educational capital, and so what matters is relative 
education, not absolute; Campbell (2006: 43; 2009) calls this the ‘sorting model’. This 
argument has been refined by Helliwell and Putnam (1999) who suggest that the 
reference group for the competition might be local or regional rather than national. 
Huang et al. (2009: 461) found both an absolute and a relative effect on participation, 
and Milligan et al. (2002: 1692) found that, in contrast to the USA, in the UK there 
was no effect of education level on the propensity to vote, although voting is a special 
kind of participation where there is no scarcity of opportunity and thus no element of 
competition. 
Democratic attitudes, by contrast, are not competitive in this sense: in principle 
everyone could be enlightened. Campbell (2006: 43) suggests this could happen in 
two ways – either through the absolute levels of education of individuals (such that 
the better educated always tend to be more civil) or through the average educational 
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levels in a society (such that people in a well-educated community tend to take from it 
a general propensity to be civil).  That different effects of education have been found 
for different dimensions of engagement suggests that a range of types of civic views 
and actions ought to be investigated: Campbell (2006: 28) proposes ‘political 
engagement, civic engagement, voting, trust, tolerance, and political knowledge’. 
(e) The other three points from recent debates relate to explanations of the association 
between education and civic values or engagement. Nieuwbeerta et al. (2000) have 
suggested three kinds of motivation (and see also Heath and Topf (1986)). There is the 
instrumental, in which attitudes and participation serve the interests of the class to 
which people belong. Thus a well-educated person would be civically active not 
because of enlightenment but because taking a leading role in society might serve 
their own and their class interests. A different motive is the expressive: people hold 
views, or are inclined to participate, because of the socialisation which they had in 
childhood. In contrast, the third putative motive is acculturation, according to which 
these expressive ties might be gradually modified if people belong to a different social 
group to those in which they were brought up. Empirical testing of these theories with 
British data (the birth cohorts) tended to confirm the acculturation theory (Paterson 
2008). If that is the most plausible, then there is a great deal of scope for education to 
have strong effects, both in breaking the link with childhood socialisation and also, 
through its actual content, shaping the character of the activism or beliefs. 
(f) Indeed, it is the content of the curriculum to which the fifth point from recent 
debates relates, and insofar as variation has been found in the effects of education we 
might be led to question any claim that education in general is linked to civic values 
and participation, as most of the other points have tended to assume. Nie and Hillygus 
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(2001), for example, have shown that social science and humanities matter more than 
other areas, and there have been similar findings from Denmark (Stubager 2008) from 
the Netherlands (van de Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004), and from Britain (Paterson 
2009). Indeed, there is some evidence that some kinds of study, notably science, might 
in fact be associated with people becoming less engaged with politics, and 
technological studies have been found in some respects to be associated with people 
becoming less liberal (Paterson 2009). In contrast to these results, the findings of 
Persson (2012: 214) suggest that the reason for the observed differences in the effect 
of academic and vocational education is not the course content but the prior 
characteristics of the students and their families. 
(g) The final point is then that it is not the overt curricular content that matters so 
much as the manner in which it is taught and learnt. A recurrent finding has been that 
the key matter is whether a course encourages independent thought. Campbell (2004; 
2006: 55), for example, found that civic attitudes are encouraged by an ‘open 
classroom environment’, by which he means students’ being encouraged to disagree 
with the teacher, the teacher’s responding to students’ opinions and the teacher’s 
offering a variety of points of view on controversial issues. This climate of learning 
probably then depends upon and contributes to people’s cognitive ability (Ceci 1991), 
a factor that has been found by Deary et al. (2008) and Sturgis et al. (2009) to be 
strongly associated with engagement and holding liberal views. So cognitive ability 
might be both a direct and an indirect influence on civic values and civic participation. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore these matters further using a range of kinds 
of data relating to Britain. Are these results – many of which are from the USA – 
relevant to Britain? What kinds of education matter for civic purposes? Does the 
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effect of education on an individual depend on the amount of education in the society 
around that person? The aim is not to cover everything – not to provide a map in the 
manner that Hall (1999) did for social capital in Britain. It is, rather, to investigate 
aspects of the questions that might test theories, and to do so from a variety of kinds 
of statistical data so as to assess how robust these theories might be. 
Data and methods 
Data 
The data come mainly from three series of surveys of individual citizens, 
supplemented in each case by other surveys of a similar kind.  
British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) 
The BSAS is an annual cross-section survey with sample size around 3,500 that has 
taken place since 1983 (BSAS web site). The respondents are selected by clustered, 
random sampling. Not all measures of interest here are asked every year, and so five 
years have been used to cover two decades at approximate intervals of five years 
(depending on the measures, and as detailed in the tables, 1986 or 1987, 1991, 1996 or 
1998, 2001, and 2005 or 2006). For certain purposes, data are used also from the 
Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (conducted annually since 1999 with approximately 
the same design as the BSAS, and with annual sample size around 1,200), and the 
British and Scottish Election Surveys that were carried out to coincide with elections 
to the UK parliament in 1979, 1992 and 1997. 
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National Child Development Study (NCDS) 
The NCDS is a longitudinal survey of a cohort of everyone born in Britain in a síngle 
week in 1958, and has followed them for half a century (NCDS web ste). The sweeps 
used here for measuring social attitudes and civic participation (as explained below) 
took place in 1991 and 2000, with some measures also from 2004. Adult educational 
attainment and social class are measured in 1981, 1991 and 2000, parental education 
and parental social class in 1974 and cognitive ability in 1974 and 1969; these 
educational and class measures, too, are explained below. The cohort member’s sex 
was taken to be that which was recorded at the first sweep in 1958. For some 
purposes, the 1970 British Cohort Study is also used (BCS web site). It is a 
longitudinal study of the cohort of everyone born in Britain in a single week in 1970. 
Sweeps used here are from 1980, 1986, 2000 and 2004. 
Although the original cohort samples had about 18,000 members, in each survey 
only around 2,500 cases had data present on all the variables that are used here. So 
multiple imputation by chained equations was used to fill the gaps, with the package 
‘mice’ in R (van Buuren, and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011). This procedure estimates 
the missing values on each variable by predicting them from a regression of its 
available values on all the other variables that are to be used in the modelling, and 
then iterating that procedure through all the variables until convergence, using 5 
chains and 15 iterations. Further details of the application of the procedure to the 
cohort data set are provided by Paterson (2013). Nevertheless, for both cohort studies, 
the results without imputation were broadly similar to those reported below, probably 
because the models included variables that are the main predictors of non-response in 
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longitudinal studies, such as cognitive ability and educational attainment (Nathan 
1999; Hawkes and Plewis 2006). 
British Household Panel Study (BHPS) 
This is a panel study of households selected by clustered, random sampling and first 
interviewed in 1991 (BHPS web site). The annual interviews from 1991 to 2008 are 
used here. In order to obtain the full 18 years of measurement, only these original 
sample members are used, not the various supplements to the sample that were added 
later. The sample size was originally around 9,000 individual adults, but attrition and 
the omission of cases with missing values on the variables used here brought this 
down to about 4,000 individuals. 
The British Youth Panel (BYP) is part of the BHPS: from wave 4 in 1994, children 
aged 11-15 in the sampled households were included, and when they reached 16 they 
became part of the core longitudinal sample. We analyse data from these young 
people when they were aged 18 – which thus span the years 1997-2008. The Youth 
Panel members’ views were taken to be those at age 18, or at the first sweep after that 
when the relevant items were next asked. Since parental views are used here as an 
indicator of political socialisation within the family, their views were taken to be their 
most recent responses prior to the Youth Panel member’s becoming part of the full 
panel: that is, at or before the sweep when the young person was aged 16. The mean 
of mother’s and father’s response (if both were present) was used to summarise 
parental response. Other information used is on respondent’s sex, father’s and 
mother’s social class, and the educational attainment of the respondent at age 18, and, 
where available, of the father and the mother. There were 640 members of the Youth 
Panel after omitting cases with missing values. 
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In all the surveys, educational attainment is summarised by six-point scales 
recording the highest qualification obtained: no qualifications, lower than lower 
secondary, lower secondary (for example, GCSE, O Level, Standard Grade), upper 
secondary (for example, A level, Higher Grade), higher education below degree (for 
example, HND) and degree. Where indicated, a five-category version of this was used, 
combining the two higher-education categories. A distinction between academic and 
vocational qualifications is also used for certain purposes (Tables 8-13). The 
distinction is mainly as drawn in the survey documentation, and for the BSAS and 
BHPS is that defined by the former General Household Survey in Britain (now the 
General Lifestyle Survey). For the cohort surveys, a more detailed classification in the 
same vein is drawn from Paterson (2009). The BHPS and the birth-cohort studies 
record qualifications obtained between sweeps, and this information is used here as 
well as baseline qualifications in 1991 (for the BHPS) or when the respondent left 
full-time education (for the cohorts). Vocational qualifications do not include any 
degree-level qualifications, all of which are classified as academic. Thus in all the 
surveys we have measures of adult learning as well as that obtained at younger ages, 
and for the BHPS we have measures of annual increments in such learning. We are 
thus able to address Campbell’s question (2006: 31) about the importance of adult 
learning. 
In the BHPS, social class was measured by the seven-category version of the 
Goldthorpe scheme (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). In the cohort studies, it was 
measured by an approximation to that scheme formed by a condensed version of the 
Registrar General’s socio-economic group (see, for example, Breen and Goldthorpe 
2001: 84). For parents in the cohort surveys, it was summarised by the higher of the 
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status of father and of mother at the 1974 sweep of the NCDS and the 1980 sweep of 
the BCS. 
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Table 1 
Questionnaire items contributing to outcome variables in the birth cohorts and the social attitudes surveys 
(common to both series unless noted) 
Left-right (high = left) 
Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth. 
There is one law for the rich and one for the poor. 
Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance. 
*Private schools should be abolished. 
Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off. 
Big business benefits owners at the expense of the workers. 
Liberal-Authoritarian (high = liberal) 
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. 
For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence. 
Schools should teach children to obey authority. 
Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values. 
Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards. 
The law should be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong. 
*Racial tolerance (high = tolerant) 
I would not mind working with people from other races. 
I would not mind if a family from another race moved in next door to me. 
I would not want a person from another race to be my boss. 
I would not mind if my child went to a school where half the children were of another race. 
It is alright for people from different races to get married. 
Political cynicism (high = optimistic) 
It does not really make much difference which political party is in power in Britain. 
*None of the political parties would do anything to benefit me. 
**Those we elect as MPs lose touch with people pretty quickly 
*Politicians are mainly in politics for their own benefit and not for the benefit of the community. 
**Parties are only interested in people's votes, not in their opinions 
*Civic membership (high = member) 
Political party, environmental organisation, other charity, school-related organisation, residents’ association, 
trade union. 
Voting  
** Elections to the UK parliament in 1979, 1992, 1997, 2001 and 2005 
** Elections to the Scottish parliament in 1999, 2003 and 2007. 
The response options to the questionnaire items were: ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, 
‘disagree’, ‘strongly disagree’. 
The wording of the items was the same or nearly the same in the two series, apart from those noted by: 
* Birth cohort surveys only. 
** British Social Attitudes Surveys only. 
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The dependent variables measuring social attitudes and civic participation are 
summarised in Tables 1 and 2, reflecting the range of dimensions of engagement 
recommended for research by Campbell (2006: 31). They are constructed by scoring 
the questionnaire items shown in the table as consecutive integers, such that all the 
items contributing to a scale have positive correlations with each other, and then 
taking the mean across items. As always in secondary analysis of diverse data sets 
stretching over a long period of time, the measures are not the same in the different 
surveys. In particular, some of the attitudes scales are available only in some of the 
surveys, and for other scales, although there is overlap of individual items, there are 
some differences between surveys. Similarly, membership of organisations is not 
available in all the surveys, and so for some purposes the most basic of all civic 
activities is used, voting in elections to the UK parliament and the Scottish parliament.  
Nevertheless, as between the BSAS and the NCDS there is a great deal of overlap 
(Table 1), and in fact the first two scales noted there are almost identical – measuring 
attitudes to the economy and the role of the state (‘left-right’) and to civil liberties 
(‘liberal-authoritarian’). There is also a broadly similar version of the former in the 
BHPS (Table 2). The scales of attitudes to the political system (labelled ‘political 
cynicism’ here) are similar but not the same in the three surveys. The scale of racial 
tolerance (Table 1) is available only in the birth-cohort surveys. The BHPS and BYP 
give a range of other scales that are not available in the other two sources (Table 2) – 
on interest in politics, on general social trust, and on attitudes to women’s rights and 
to the rights of homosexual people. In the birth cohorts, there is information about 
participation in the civic organisations noted in Table 1. In the BHPS, there is 
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information relating to a different but overlapping range of civic organisations, as 
noted in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Questionnaire items contributing to outcome variables in the British Household Panel Study and British 
Youth Panel, 1991-2008 (and the number of survey sweeps when the scale was measured) 
Political cynicism (high = optimistic) (7 sweeps) 
On the whole, what governments do in Britain reflects the wishes of the people. 
Ordinary people don’t really have a chance to influence what governments do. 
Governments can be trusted to place the needs of the nation above the interests of their own party. 
Political interest (high = interested) (14 sweeps) 
How interested would you say you are in politics?* 
General social trust (high = trusting) (6 sweeps) 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing 
with people?** 
Left-right (high = left) (7 sweeps) 
Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth. 
There is one law for the rich and one for the poor. 
Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems. 
Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership. 
It is the government’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one. 
Strong trade unions are needed to protect the working conditions and wages of employees. 
Women’s rights (high = support) (9 sweeps) 
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works. 
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full time job. 
A woman and her family would all be happier if she goes out to work. 
Both the husband and wife should contribute to the household income. 
Having a full-time job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person. 
A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after the home and family. 
Employers should make special arrangements to help mothers combine jobs and childcare. 
A single parent can bring up children as well as a couple. 
Homosexual relations (high = liberal) (6 sweeps) 
Homosexual relationships are always wrong. 
Membership of civic organisations, and active in them (11 sweeps) 
Political party; environmental group; school-related organisation; residents’ association; neighbourhood 
watch; church organisation; voluntary services group; trade union; social club; women’s group; sports club 
Except where noted in the footnotes below, the response options to the questionnaire items were: ‘strongly agree’, 
‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘strongly disagree’. 
* Response options: ‘very interested’, ‘fairly interested’, ‘not very interested’, ‘not at all interested’. 
** Response options: ‘most people can be trusted’, ‘you can’t be too careful’, ‘it depends’. 
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One later sweep of the NCDS (in 2008) did record some of the information 
summarised in Table 1, but not for the full set of items except in relation to the 
political cynicism scale and the membership measures. So as not to weaken further the 
comparability with the other surveys, that 2008 sweep is not used here (but see 
Paterson (2013)). 
Despite the discrepancies of measure, therefore, it is hoped that the breadth of 
coverage and the diversity of kinds of data – cross-sectional, panel data and long-term 
cohort studies – are valuable enough to compensate for the loss of exact 
comparability. In any case, no attempt is made to compare measures directly across 
surveys. The interpretation concentrates always on the relationship of educational 
attainment with the various outcomes.  
Methods 
The data from the BSAS are used mainly for introductory and descriptive purposes, 
because that series provides the least information about education and the least scope 
for investigating detailed links between education and attitudes or participation. The 
advantage of the BSAS is that it draws a fresh sample every year and thus is reliably 
able to measure change over time.  
The basis of all the analysis is linear regression; using logistic regression for 
dichotomous outcomes gave very similar patterns of results to those shown here. The 
association with education is measured by including in the models the six-category or 
five-category summary of highest educational attainment as a set of indicators of 
differences from the reference category of ‘no qualification’. Where required, control 
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varables were added as noted below; where such a variable was categorical (for 
example, social class) it too was entered as a set of indicators. The purpose of controls 
is to enable estimatation of the direct effect of education, rather than effects that are 
through, for example, early socialisation or current social class. This basic modelling 
was done in R. 
A refinement of this simple structure was used for the BHPS. The structure of the 
data is of repeated measures over several sweeps (the number noted for each measure 
in Table 2). Therefore some account has to be taken of serial correlation between the 
same measure collected on successive occasion, especially in order to be able to assess 
the association with new educational attainment between sweeps. The essence of the 
model is then as follows. Let yti be the response (on some particular measure) of panel 
member i at sweep t. Let qi be the baseline educational attainment of that panel 
member at sweep 1, and let xti be the attainment since the most recent sweep before 
sweep t when the response was recorded (for t equal to those occasions from 2 to 18 
when the response was recorded). The structure is then a two-level model of time 
points within panel members: 
yti  = b0 + b1qi + b2 xti + ui + eti 
in which b1 is the general association of attainment with the measure, and b2 is the 
association with attainment since the previous occasion on which the response was 
recorded. Further refinement to the model can be obtained by adding control variables 
to the right-hand side of the equation – for example, age, social class or sex. 
The term ui is simply the un-measured heterogeneity among panel members. The 
autocorrelation of the response between occasions can be captured in the error 
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structure that is imposed upon the final term in the equation, which is the random 
variation for respondent i at time t. The Durbin-Watson statistic calculated for the 
responses showed that there was indeed autocorrelation between responses by the 
same individual on successive occasions. In principle, the structure of the 
autocorrelations could be complex, but Rasbash et al. (2009: 74-9) provide a 
convenient way of estimating a linear autocorrelation in the multilevel modelling 
package MLwiN, and that turned out to be sufficient here. According to this linear 
structure, the covariance between the error terms on two occasions t1 and t2 is: 
21
1),cov(
21 tt
ee itit −
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in which the term α is to be estimated. The autocorrelation is then α divided by the 
residual variance of the e terms. When this model was run (using MLwiN) for each of 
the responses in the BHPS, calculating a Durbin-Watson statistic for the resulting 
residuals showed that there was no longer evidence of autocorrelation. 
The BYP, because it had only a relatively small sample, is modelled with linear 
regression, neglecting the chronological structure of the data. However, a crude 
allowance for time trends in the dependent variable is made by including among the 
explanatory variables a linear term recording the year in which the respondent turned 
18. 
In order to include the broad range of surveys and measures, it is not possible to 
present the details of the analysis of all measures for each survey. So in several 
aspects of the presentation of findings, selected measures are given, illustrating the 
main points. Similarly, considering in detail all aspects of the association between 
educational attainment and the outcome measures is not feasible here, and so the 
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association with education is mostly illustrated in terms of the effects of holding a 
degree, or more generally any kind of higher-education qualification. For reasons 
noted in the Introduction, these are the most interesting categories in recent decades, 
because of the expansion of higher education and because of the claims made by some 
authors (such as Gutmann 1987) that higher education is particularly conducive to 
civic values. The proportion of respondents in the BSAS of 1986 who held a higher 
education qualification was 19%; in 2006, it was 29%. The proportion specifically 
with a degree rose from 7% to 17%. Nevertheless, despite concentration on higher 
education, sheaf coefficients (Heise 1972), encapsulating the whole effect of the 
education variable, were also calculated, and in all cases showed patterns that were 
similar to those shown by the coefficient for higher education; these are not reported 
further here. 
Results 
Throughout the presentation of results, the concentration is on four sets of questions 
that are derived from the discussion which was summarised in the Introduction: 
(1) The most basic question arises from the points (a) and (b) raised by that discussion 
– to test whether, during the recent expansion of higher education and of lifelong 
learning, the association between it and civic attitudes or civic participation has 
remained strong (as Hall (1999), for example, might be taken to suggest). We saw also 
in point (c) earlier that Nie et al. (1996) were sceptical about the most general claims 
for the effects of education, finding that that there might be a constant effect on 
attitudes but a declining effect on participation. The basic question and the questions 
raised by Nie et al are dealt with in the first section below. 
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(2) The refinement from Helliwell and Putnam (1999), in reply to Nie et al., that there 
might be variation in any effect by regional educational context, is dealt with in the 
second section below.  
(3) and (4) The third and fourth sections below relate to points (e) and (f) in the 
discussion earlier, concerning the content and manner of learning – whether some 
curricular areas (section (3) below), and some types of learning (section (4) below), 
are more conducive to civic attitudes or participation than others. Point (d) from the 
earlier discussion (whether motivation is instrumental or expressive or a matter of 
acculturation) is used in the final section of the paper to suggest some sociological 
explanations. 
(1) Educational expansion and types of civic effects 
First we look at the evidence from the BSAS in Table 3, which displays variation over 
time (from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s) in the coefficient of ‘higher education’ in 
simple regressions which relate the scales shown to the five-category education 
variable. The striking feature is that there is no single pattern. For the political-
cynicism and to some extent the left-right scales, there is declining association. That 
is, holding a higher-education certificate (when compared to holding no qualifications 
at all) is less strongly associated with being optimistic about politics at the end of the 
period than at the beginning, and is also less strongly associated with position on the 
left-right scale. In contrast, there is some rise in association of higher education with 
being liberal (as opposed to authoritarian). There is no evidence that the growth of 
higher education has led to a weakening of the association between taking part in it 
and voting, and indeed, if anything, there is some (though not strong) evidence that 
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the association might have strengthened. None of this is consistent with Nie et al. 
(1996). 
That analysis has the advantage of looking at change over two decades during 
which participation in higher education rose by one half. However, the main weakness 
of such an approach is that it conflates birth cohorts, when in fact it was in younger 
groups that participation in higher education rose most sharply. Re-doing the analysis 
in Table 3 for different synthetic cohorts (comparing those born before 1940 with 
those born after 1960) showed no consistent tendency for any cohort effects, but a 
more satisfactory way of allowing for cohort is to use the second main source of data, 
the birth cohorts. The two birth cohorts conveniently span a period when there was a 
large rise in degree-level attainment: 12% of cohort members in the NCDS held a 
degree at age 33, while 21% did so in the BCS at age 30. Results are in Table 4, 
showing the effect of holding a degree, with and without control for other predictors. 
Comparing first the two sweeps of the NCDS, a decade apart, we can see that the 
coefficients do not change much at all.  
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Table 3 
Association of holding a higher-education qualification with 
scales of social attitudes and with voting, 1986-2006 
Scale F-test for interactive 
effect of year and 
qualification 
1986/7 1991 1996/7 2001 2005/6 
Liberal-authoritarian 
(high = liberal) 
2.38 
F(16,12097): p=0.002 
0.41 (0.05)  0.52 (0.05) 0.48 (0.03) 0.58 (0.03) 0.53 (0.03) 
Political cynicism 
(high = optimistic) 
3.07 
F(16,6837): p<0.001 
not asked 0.78 (0.06) 0.59 (0.06) 0.50 (0.06) 0.44 (0.04) 
Left-right 
(high=left) 
2.82  
F(16,13509): p<0.001 
-0.59 (0.06) -0.49 (0.04) -0.30 (0.03) -0.39 (0.04) -0.36 (0.03) 
Voting 
(high = voted) 
1.33  
F(12,12353): p=0.19 
0.022 (0.02) not relevant 0.048 (0.02) 0.063 (0.02) 0.075 (0.02) 
Percentage with higher 
education qualification  
19/21 22 25/28 29 29 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey, year shown. Where two dates are shown, the first and third scales are for 
1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006; political cynicism and voting were asked in 2005 instead of 2006, and voting 
was asked in 1987, and in 1998 in relation to the UK general election of 1997. 
The first four lines of the body of the table show the coefficient for ‘higher education qualification’ in separate 
linear regression models in each year. The models contained a categorical explanatory variable for attainment 
(five categories). Standard errors are in brackets. The F-tests are for a joint regression model with attainment, 
year, and the interactive effect of year and attainment. 
 
Table 4 
Association of holding a degree with attitudes and membership: 
effects of age and of cohort 
 NCDS age 33 (1991) NCDS age 42 (2000) BCS age 30 (2000) 
 Coeff. (s.e.) Coeff. (s.e.) Coeff. (s.e.) 
Libertarian-authoritarian 
(high=liberal) 0.85 (0.06) 
0.50 (0.07) 
0.96 (0.05) 
0.51 (0.07) 
0.80 (0.05) 
0.61 (0.05) 
Political cynicism 
(high=optimistic) 
0.81 (0.03) 
0.35 (0.04) 
0.78 (0.04) 
0.41 (0.05) 
0.64 (0.10) 
0.42 (0.09) 
Racism-antiracism 
(high=tolerant) 
0.57 (0.05) 
0.26 (0.05) 
0.67 (0.04) 
0.31 (0.04) 
0.86 (0.05) 
0.75 (0.05) 
Left-right 
(high=left) 
-0.58 (0.03) 
-0.05 (0.04) 
-0.63 (0.05) 
-0.09 (0.05) 
-0.90 (0.07) 
-0.64 (0.07) 
Membership of 
organisations 
0.28 (0.02) 
0.17 (0.02) 
0.33 (0.02) 
0.17 (0.03) 
0.21 (0.02) 
0.16 (0.02) 
Sources: NCDS and BCS with imputatation. 
The table shows the coefficient for ‘degree qualification’ in separate linear regression models. Standard errors 
are in brackets. 
For the upper coefficient in each cell, the only explanatory variable was a categorical measure of highest 
attainment (six categories) at the specified sweep, with reference category ‘no qualifications’. 
For the lower coefficient in each cell, the model additionally contained controls for respondent sex, respondent 
ability at ages 11 and 16 (NCDS) or age 10 (BCS), and measures of parental education and parental social class 
when the respondent was aged 16. 
 21 
 
This absence of change excludes there being much of an age effect. Another way of 
assessing any sources of change is to hold age constant, and compare the NCDS with 
the later birth cohort at similar ages – the first and third columns. The only evidence 
of change that is the same direction as in the BSAS is in political cyncism, where the 
association with holding a degree weakens. For the libertarian-authoritarian scales, 
there is a weakening here but there may have been a strengthening with the BSAS. 
The opposite contrast is true of the left-right scale. There is otherwise no tendency to 
confirm the BSAS results, nor, again, to confirm Hall or Nie et al.. A weakening 
effect on political cynicism and on libertarian-authoritarian views runs directly 
counter to their theories. 
(2) Regional educational context 
Helliwell and Putnam, as we saw, responded to the theory of Nie et al. by proposing a 
regional aspect to any tendency for education to be associated with civic participation. 
So we look specifically next at selected geographical areas.  
Table 5 compares the regression coefficients for four illustrative areas in the year 
2000 – London, South-east England, northern England, and Scotland; the reason for 
taking that year is that the BSAS asked about membership of organisations then, both 
locally (for example, residents’ associations, parents’ associations) and nationally (for 
example, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, Greenpeace) (Paterson 2002). The 
main point to note in respect of attitudes is that there is variation in the association 
with holding a higher-education qualification, but not in any way that follows the level 
of higher education in the area (as shown in the bottom row of the table): there is no 
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consistent tendency for the area with the lowest level of higher education (northern 
England) to have the highest or lowest association of higher education with attitudes; 
and the two areas with equally high levels of higher education – London and Scotland 
– have quite different patterns of association. There is hardly any association of 
membership of local organisations with holding a higher education qualification. The 
pattern of association with membership of national organisations no more than loosely 
follows that predicted by Helliwell and Putnam: the coefficient is indeed lower in 
London and south-east England than in northern England, but it is lower in London 
also than in Scotland where educational levels are at the same levels as in London. 
Membership may be specific to the organisations examined, and so perhaps a more 
universal test is voting (Tables 6 and 7). Table 6 compares London and northern 
England, showing the association between voting and holding a higher-education 
qualification for five general elections to the UK parliament from 1979 to 2005. There 
is no trend consistent with the Helliwell and Putnam prediction: in London, as the 
contextual level of higher education rose from 13% in 1979 to 37% in 2005, there 
was, if anything, a slight tendency for the individual-level association between voting 
and higher education to strengthen. There is no discernible pattern at all in the values 
of the association in northern England. The first column of Table 7, for Scotland, is 
not consistent with the prediction either: Scotland resembles London only in that same 
year, 2005. So voting for the UK parliament gives little support to the prediction that 
high local levels of education make the association between participation and 
education weaker. 
The main purpose of Table 7, on Scotland, is to show a different point, which is 
that there seems to be an effect of political system that is not encapsulated in the 
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theories outlined in the Introduction. The first column there shows the association in 
Scotland between holding a higher-education qualification and voting in elections to 
the UK parliament. The second column shows the analogous associations for elections 
to the Scottish parliament. The latter association is consistently weaker.  
Table 5 
Association of holding a higher-education qualification with 
scales of social attitudes and with membership of organisations, by selected area, 2000 
Scale London  South-east 
England  
North England Scotland 
Liberal-authoritarian 
(high = liberal) 
0.24 (0.11) 0.63 (0.08) 0.47 (0.15) 0.52 (0.11) 
Political cynicism 
(high = optimistic) 0.47 (0.14) 0.51 (0.11) 0.36 (0.16) 0.54 (0.12) 
Left-right 
(high=left) -0.42 (0.14) -0.39 (0.11) -0.33 (0.16) -0.33 (0.12) 
Membership of local 
organisations 
(high = member) 
-0.034 (0.07) 0.086 (0.04) 0.043 (0.04) -0.008 (0.04) 
Membership of national 
organisations 
(high = member) 
0.12 (0.07) 0.19 (0.06) 0.28 (0.08) 0.20 (0.06) 
Percentage with higher 
education qualification 36 31 17 36 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey, 2000.  
The table shows the coefficient for ‘higher education qualification’ in separate linear regression models. The 
models contained a categorical explanatory variable for attainment (five categories), with reference category ‘no 
qualifications’. Standard errors are in brackets.  
 
Table 6 
Association of holding a higher-education qualification with voting 
by selected area in England, 1979-2005 
Year London  North England 
 Coeff. (s.e.) 
Percentage with higher 
education qualification Coeff. (s.e.) 
Percentage with higher 
education qualification 
1979 0.046 (0.09) 13 0.020 (0.14) 7 
1992 0.031 (0.05) 29 0.17 (0.10) 7 
1997 -0.073 (0.06) 30 0.22 (0.072) 26 
2001 0.10 (0.07) 37 0.071 (0.09) 24 
2005 0.13 (0.06) 37 0.011 (0.08) 21 
Source: British Election Survey (1979, 1992 and 1997) and British Social Attitudes Survey (2001 and 2005).  
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The table shows the coefficient for ‘higher education qualification’ in separate linear regression models. The 
models contained a categorical explanatory variable for attainment (five categories) with reference category ‘no 
qualifications’. Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table 7 
Association of holding a higher-education qualification with voting in Scottish elections 
by level of parliament, 1997-2007 
Year UK parliament Scottish parliament 
 Percentage with 
higher education 
qualification 
1997 0.048 (0.04) - 22 
1999 - 0.039 (0.03) 27 
2001 0.065 (0.03) - 29 
2003 - 0.023 (0.03) 30 
2005 0.14 (0.03) - 31 
2007 - 0.039 (0.03) 32 
Source: Scottish Election Survey (1997) and Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (1999-2007).  
The table shows the coefficient for ‘higher education qualification’ in separate linear regression models. The 
models contained a categorical explanatory variable for attainment (five categories), with reference category ‘no 
qualifications’. Standard errors are in brackets.  
 
(3) Broad curricular area 
Few of the theories summarised in the Introduction draw any distinctions among 
different kinds of education. Most data sets do not allow these to be drawn readily 
either, but there is often the possibility of distinguishing between academic and 
vocational courses, especially in the post-school advanced sector that is our main 
focus here. Table 8 returns to the same BSAS data sets and topics as Table 3, now 
showing separately the association with academic and with vocational attainment. The 
pattern is fairly clear. For the liberal-authoritarian and political-cyncism scales, there 
is a much stronger association with academic education than with vocational 
education. That is probably also true for the left-right scale, although the difference is 
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smaller and less surely established. There is no consistent difference on the voting 
measure.  
Table 8 
Association of holding an academic or vocational higher-education qualification with 
scales of social attitudes and with voting, 1986-2006 
Scale Type of 
qualif’n 
F-test for interactive 
effect of year and 
qualification 
1986/7 1991 1996/7 2001 2005/6 
Liberal-
authoritarian 
(high = liberal) 
Acad. 2.10 
F(16,12097): p=0.006 
0.72 (0.06) 0.72 (0.06) 0.70 (0.03) 0.71 (0.03) 0.63 (0.03) 
Voc. 2.0 
F(16,12097): p=0.01 
0.05 (0.06) 0.16 (0.05) 0.11 (0.03) 0.14 (0.04) 0.03 (0.03) 
Political cynicism 
(high = optimistic) 
Acad. 3.00 
F(12,6837): p<0.001 
not asked 0.78 (0.07) 0.71 (0.07) 0.63 (0.07) 0.52 (0.04) 
Voc. 6.03 
F(12,6837): p<0.001 
not asked 0.51 (0.07) 0.27 (0.07) 0.13 (0.07) 0.05 (0.04) 
Left-right 
(high=left) 
Acad. 3.10 
F(16,13509): p<0.001 
-0.51 (0.08) -0.42 (0.05) -0.33 (0.04) -0.37 (0.04) -0.34 (0.03) 
Voc. 4.11 
F(16,13509): p<0.001 
-0.46 (0.07) -0.38 (0.04) -0.09 (0.04) -0.21 (0.04) -0.16 (0.04) 
Voting 
(high = voted) 
Acad. 2.82 
F(12,12353): p<0.001 
0.036 
(0.03) not relevant 
0.049 
(0.03) 
0.067 
(0.02) 0.069 (0.02) 
Voc. 0.77 
F(12,12353): p=0.68 
0.039 
(0.02) not relevant 
0.044 
(0.02) 
0.035 
(0.02) 0.077 (0.02) 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey, year shown. For definition of academic and vocational qualifications, see 
text. For other notes, see notes to Table 3. 
 
Table 9 
Association with attitudes and membership at age 33 of academic and vocational higher education education 
between ages 23 and 33 
 Academic Vocational 
 Coeff. (s.e.) Coeff. (s.e.) 
Libertarian-authoritarian 
(high=liberal) 
0.61 (0.07) 0.12 (0.02) 
Political cynicism 
(high=optimistic) 
0.60 (0.06) 0.20 (0.03) 
Racism-antiracism 
(high=tolerant) 
0.49 (0.06) 0.03 (0.02) 
Left-right 
(high=left) 
-0.33 (0.05) -0.21 (0.03) 
Membership of organisations 0.23 (0.02) 0.05 (0.01) 
Sources: NCDS with imputation. 
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The table shows the coefficient for ‘higher education qualification’ at age 33 in separate linear regression 
models. The models contained categorical explanatory variables for highest attainment (five categories) at the 
age-33 and age-23 sweeps, with reference category ‘no qualifications’. Standard errors are in brackets. 
As with Table 3, we might still ask whether the mixture of age cohorts in the BSAS 
samples is confusing trends here, but similar conclusions can be drawn holding cohort 
constant, in Table 9, which uses the NCDS to show the association of attitudes and 
membership with holding an academic or a vocational higher-education qualification. 
Here the evidence is very clear: academic qualifications are more strongly associated 
with attitudes and with membership than vocational qualifications. 
An alternative longitudinal test is available from the BHPS, modelling the effects 
on attitudes and on participation of courses taken between two time points. There is a 
great deal of course-taking in the 18 years of the data from that survey used here. 
Between any two yearly waves, around 3-4% of respondents had gained a new 
academic qualification and some 1-2% had gained a new vocational qualification. 
Over the whole period, 24% of respondents had gained at least one academic 
qualification and 11% had gained at least one vocational qualification. So, allowing 
for correlated errors as explained in the Methods section, we can assess the effects of 
academic and vocational courses on attitudes and membership shortly after.  
The results over the range of measures are exemplified in Tables 10-13. Table 10 is 
for political cynicism. The strongest association of an educational variable with the 
scale is baseline academic achievement (when the panel started in 1991): broadly, the 
higher the respondent’s achievement the less cynical they are. By contrast, baseline 
vocational achievement (final column) has no association with the response on this 
scale (and the same was true of the variable recording extra vocational qualifications, 
and so it is not included in the model shown here). The closest we have to a causal 
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test, however, is in the middle column for taking extra academic courses between one 
occasion on which this scale was measured and the next. Taking an extra academic 
degree was associated with the respondent’s being less cynical, reinforcing the effect 
on attitudes of previous academic attainment. 
Table 10 
Repeated-measures model of political cynicism 
(high = optimistic) 
Level of attainment 
(ref. cat. ‘none’): 
Academic level in 1991 Extra academic courses Vocational level in 1991 
Low 0.062 (0.03)  -0.083 (0.14) -0.034 (0.04) 
Lower secondary 0.086 (0.02) 0.025 (0.07) -0.026 (0.02) 
Upper secondary 0.148 (0.03) -0.005 (0.05) -0.041 (0.04) 
Sub-degree 0.141 (0.03) -0.007 (0.01) 0.002 (0.03) 
Degree 0.239 (0.03) 0.096 (0.03) not relevant 
Source: BHPS 1991-2008. Sample size 4262. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Table 11 
Repeated-measures model of political interest 
(high = interested) 
Level of attainment 
(ref. cat. ‘none’): 
Academic level in 
1991 
Extra academic 
courses 
Vocational level in 
1991 
Extra vocational 
courses 
Low -0.12 (0.05) 0.051 (0.08) 0.12 (0.06) -0.056 (0.11) 
Lower secondary 0.12 (0.04) -0.019 (0.05) -0.006 (0.04) -0.082 (0.02) 
Upper secondary 0.34 (0.05) -0.032 (0.04) -0.17 (0.06) -0.048 (0.02) 
Sub-degree 0.42 (0.04) -0.048 (0.01) -0.084 (0.05) -0.039 (0.03) 
Degree 0.72 (0.04) -0.017 (0.03) not relevant not relevant 
Source: BHPS 1991-2008. Sample size 3665. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Table 12 
Repeated-measures model of generalised social trust 
(high = trusting) 
Level of attainment 
(ref. cat. ‘none’): 
Academic level in 1991 Extra academic courses Vocational level in 1991 
Low 0.023 (0.03)  0.153 (0.33) 0.021 (0.03) 
Lower secondary 0.108 (0.02) -0.111 (0.06) 0.014 (0.02) 
Upper secondary 0.175 (0.03) -0.044 (0.04) -0.022 (0.02) 
Sub-degree 0.140 (0.02) -0.029 (0.01) 0.048 (0.02) 
Degree 0.353 (0.02) 0.011 (0.04) not relevant 
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Source: BHPS 1991-2008. Sample size 3847. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Table 13 
Repeated-measures model of attitude to women’s rights 
(high = support) 
Level of attainment 
(ref. cat. ‘none’): 
Academic level in 1991 Extra academic courses Vocational level in 1991 
Low 0.053 (0.03) 0.080 (0.06) -0.034 (0.04) 
Lower secondary 0.070 (0.02) 0.028 (0.03) -0.037 (0.02) 
Upper secondary 0.079 (0.04) 0.016 (0.03) -0.028 (0.04) 
Sub-degree 0.017 (0.03) -0.008 (0.01) -0.006 (0.03) 
Degree 0.14 (0.03) -0.019 (0.02) not relevant 
Source: BHPS 1991-2008. Sample size 3750. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
The second example (Table 11) shows a different pattern, here for political interest. 
There is a very strong association with baseline academic qualifications, political 
interest rising across the rising levels of education. Unlike with political cynicism, 
taking an extra academic degree does not have any effect on that (coefficient of -0.017 
(s.e. 0.03)), and indeed taking a sub-degree academic qualification slightly weakens 
the tendency for such qualifications to be associated with political interest (-0.048 (s.e. 
0.01)). There is some evidence, too, that higher levels of vocational qualification, 
whether at the baseline or later, weaken the association with political interest, insofar 
as the coefficients for upper secondary vocational courses are negative, whether in the 
baseline or in extra qualifications. There is also an interesting point at the other end of 
the spectrum of attainment: whereas very low levels of academic attainment are 
associated with lower political interest than being in the reference category of having 
no academic attainment at all, the opposite is true of very low levels of initial 
vocational qualifications (0.12 (s.e. 0.06)). Vocational success at low levels of 
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achievement may engage people more with the political system than academic success 
only at these levels, whereas vocational success at higher levels may have the opposite 
effect. 
Since many other authors have analysed effects on generalised social trust (for 
example, Sturgis et al. (2010) and Huang et al. (2008)), it is informative to look at 
that outcome here: Table 12. Again, there is the familiar pattern of a strong 
association with baseline academic achievement. There is no association with any 
level of vocational attainment below higher education, and a weak association with 
that (0.048 (s.e. 0.023)). Notably, though, taking extra academic courses at sub-degree 
level somewhat weakens the positive effect of academic education on trust (-0.029 
(s.e. 0.012)). 
A final illustration of the longitudinal modelling of attitudes from the BHPS is in 
connection with attitudes to women’s rights, in Table 13. In a general pattern of 
almost no educational effects, the one clear exception appears to be for degree-level 
academic qualifications, which show a strong positive association with supporting 
women’s rights. This association was not weakened when respondent’s sex was added 
to the model as a control: thus both sexes seem to become more in favour of women’s 
rights when they gain an academic degree. However, support for women’s rights and 
gaining an academic degree are both associated with age, younger people being more 
likely to support these rights and to hold that qualification. In a further model which 
added respondent’s age as a control, the association with holding a degree vanished 
(becoming 0.012 (s.e. 0.03)). Indeed, holding a sub-degree academic qualification was 
then associated with having a less positive view of women’s rights (-0.054 (s.e. 
0.027)), and, moreover, taking an extra academic degree or sub-degree qualification 
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had a similar negative association (respectively -0.040 (s.e. 0.019) and -0.019 (s.e. 
0.008)). Thus it is age more than education that explains attitudes to women’s rights. 
We can summarise this analysis of academic and vocational education by saying 
that not all education has a positive effect, or indeed any effect, on civic values or 
participation. On the whole, academic study seems to have stronger effects on civic 
values and behaviour than vocational study. This is consistent with the evidence 
summarised in the Introduction on the importance of curriculum. Some effects depend 
on the age at which a course is taken: for example, some kinds of courses taken in 
adulthood appeared to weaken political interest (Table 11). There might also be 
important period (or contextual) effects, for example on women’s rights. 
(4) Manner of learning 
We noted in the introduction the evidence from other studies that being encouraged to 
think independently was associated with being more engaged with civic matters. None 
of the data sets contains direct measures of such pedagogical experiences, but in the 
NCDS there are measures of reading books for pleasure. For comparison, but only at 
later ages, there is also information about computer use. The question responses 
summarised in Table 14 show the levels of reading for pleasure at ages 16, 23 and 46; 
the questionnaire wording emphasised that what was being asked about was not to 
include reading educational textbooks (ages 16 and 23) or for work or study (at age 
46). Around a half of the sample read books often, and perhaps a quarter to around a 
third rarely did so.  
These scales were entered into regression equations as continuous covariates 
(scored in consecutive integer values with the highest corresponding to the most 
 31 
frequent reading), and controlling for the variables noted in the footnote to Table 15. 
The result in Table 15 is clear and almost entirely consistent: even after all these 
controls, at both ages reading for pleasure was associated with being more liberal, less 
politically cynical, more racially tolerant, and more civically active. At age 23 only, 
reading is also associated with being more left-wing. The pattern of results at age 46 
was the same if the age-23 measure was used (and in fact was very close to the pattern 
for age 33 shown in the table). It was also very similar at each age if the age-16 
measure was used. Thus reading reinforces the effects of education, except perhaps on 
the left-right scale for which it may have an opposite effect.  
The association with reading is stronger and more consistent than the association 
with computer use. The last column of Table 14 showed that computer use at age 46 
was broadly at the same level as reading at that age, but the correlation between them 
was low (0.17, calculated as either a Spearman or a Pearson coefficient). Table 16 
shows the results at age 42 of putting both the age-46 reading scale and the age-46 
computer-use scale into the models. The coefficients for the reading scale differ from 
those in the second column of Table 15 only because of the addition of the computer-
use scale, and that they are nearly identical reflects the low correlation of these two 
scales. On four of the response scales, the association with computer use is in the 
same direction as the association with reading, but is notably weaker. On the left-right 
scale, the association is in the opposite direction to that with reading.  
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Table 14 
Frequency of reading books and of computer use, 1958 cohort 
Reading at age 16 
% 
Reading at age 23 
% 
Reading at age 46 
% 
Computer use at age 46 
% 
Often 27 5 times per 
week 
21 Every day 24 Every day 31 
Sometimes 46 3-4 times per 
week 
11 4-5 days per 
week 
13 2-4 times per 
week 
21 
  1-2 times per 
week 
12 At least once 
per week 
13 Once per week 10 
  2-3 times per 
month 
8 At least once 
per month 
12 Less than once 
per week 
13 
  Once per 
month 
10     
Hardly ever 
or no chance 
28 Less 39 Less often 25   
    Never 13 Never 25 
Sample size 
(before 
imputation) 
11,362  12,516  9,531  9,534 
Source: NCDS.  
 
Table 15 
Association of reading scales with attitudes and membership 
 Reading scale at age 23 with 
attitudes and membership at age 33 
Reading scale at age 46 with 
attitudes and membership at age 42 
 Coeff. (s.e.) Coeff. (s.e.) 
Libertarian-authoritarian 
(high=liberal) 
0.042 (0.005) 0.057 (0.007) 
Political cynicism 
(high=optimistic) 
0.017 (0.006) 0.024 (0.009) 
Racism-antiracism 
(high=tolerant) 
0.045 (0.007) 0.066 (0.006) 
Left-right 
(high=left) 
0.015 (0.004) 0.007 (0.006) 
Membership of organisations 0.014 (0.002) 0.02 (0.003) 
Sources: NCDS with imputation. 
The table shows the coefficient for reading scales at ages noted (as shown in Table 14). A high value of the 
reading scale means more reading. The regression models in both columns controlled for: gender, cognitive 
ability at ages 11 and 16, parental education and parental social class when cohort member was aged 16, 
educational attainment at age 23, social class at age 23, educational attainment at age 33,and social class at age 
33. In addition, for the second column, there is control for educational attainment and social class at age 42. 
The models were linear regressions. Standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 16 
Association of reading and computer-use scales (age 46) with attitudes and membership (age 42) 
 Reading  Computer use 
 Coeff. (s.e.) Coeff. (s.e.) 
Libertarian-authoritarian 
(high=liberal) 
0.057 (0.006) 0.016 (0.006) 
Political cynicism 
(high=optimistic) 
0.024 (0.009) 0.012 (0.008) 
Racism-antiracism 
(high=tolerant) 
0.065 (0.006) 0.025 (0.008) 
Left-right 
(high=left) 
0.008 (0.006) -0.029 (0.007) 
Membership of organisations 0.019 (0.003) 0.018 (0.004) 
Sources: NCDS with imputation. 
The table shows the coefficient for reading and computer-use scales at age 46  in regression models containing 
both of these scales and controlling for factors noted in Table 15. A high value of the reading and computer-use 
scales mean more reading or computer use. The models were linear regressions. Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Informal self-education thus appears to influence civic values and a propensity to 
participate. The relevant habits may be laid down by age 16, and a further source of 
data suggests that civic influences from the family are stronger at this young age than 
any influences from formal education. The British Youth Panel allows us to compare 
the influence of formal education with the influence of parental values and 
propensities measured in exactly the same way as for the young people themselves. 
Each regression also controls for respondent sex, father’s occupation, mother’s 
occupation, father’s education, mother’s education, and (as a linear trend) the year in 
which the respondent was aged 18. Table 17 summarises the results. For each measure 
of young people’s civic values and participation, the table shows the regression sum 
of squares associated with formal attainment and with the same civic measure for 
parents, and the p-value for the corresponding F-test. Not shown in the table is that, in 
 34 
each case, the regression coefficient linking the young person’s and the parents’ views 
or activities was strongly positive, and also that the association with the young 
person’s educational attainment was consistent with the patterns we have seen in other 
data sets. With one exception – membership of civic organisations – the sum of 
squares for the parental measure is greater than that for formal attainment. In all cases 
except attitudes to homosexual relationships the p-value for the association with 
attainment is above 0.05 after adding the parental measure, whereas (in details not 
shown) the p-value for the parental measure remained below 0.05 even after adding 
formal attainment. Thus family socialisation does seem to matter more than formal 
education (as Egerton (2002a,b) noted for participation, using an earlier part of this 
time series). 
Table 17 
Association of young people’s civic values and activities with educational attainment and with parental civic 
values and activities  
 Educational attainment at 
age 18 (added before 
parental values and 
activities) 
Parental values and 
activities (added before  
respondent’s attainment) 
Educational attainment 
at age 18 (added after 
parental values and 
activities) 
Political cynicism 
(high = optimistic) 
3.17 
(0.66) 
8.74 
(0.003) 
3.66 
(0.57) 
Interest in politics 
(high = interested) 
8.38 
(0.097) 
29.5 
(<0.001) 
7.23 
(0.13) 
General trust 
(high = trusting) 
1.72 
(0.87) 
15.4 
(<0.001) 
0.99 
(0.96) 
Left-right 
(high = left) 
8.36 
(0.22) 
21.4 
(<0.001) 
8.09 
(0.12) 
Women’s rights 
(high = support) 
1.18 
(0.93) 
40.3 
(<0.001) 
0.59 
(0.98) 
Homosexual relations 
(high = liberal) 
14.8 
(0.04) 
60.0 
(<0.001) 
14.8 
(0.002) 
Civic membership 
(high = member) 
10.4 
(0.049) 
5.53 
(0.015) 
8.62 
(0.098) 
Civic activism 
(high = active) 
5.50 
(0.33) 
15.7 
(<0.001) 
3.59 
(0.57) 
Source: British Youth Panel, 1994-2008. 
The parental values and activities are measured on the same scale as those of the respondent. Educational 
attainment is measured as a categorical variable with 6 values (see text). The table shows the regression sum of 
squares, and the p-value for the corresponding F-test, associated with each term (as noted in the column 
headings) when it is entered into a linear regression with the outcome as noted in the row. Each regression also 
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controls for respondent sex, father’s occupation, mother’s occupation, father’s education, mother’s education, 
and (as a linear trend) the year in which the respondent was aged 18. 
 
Discussion 
For Britain, there might thus appear to be no neat conclusions about trends, if we 
follow the theories that have been invoked in connection with the USA. The effect of 
education on civic values and on activism is not uniform over time: for some it 
strengthens, for some it weakens, and for some it broadly remains the same. The 
general claims for education and civic values are just too simple; it is still the case, as 
Heath and Topf argued using data from 1983, that ‘we must be careful to avoid any 
simplistic theory of educational causation’ (1986: 565). Moreover, the variation is not 
as neat as predicted by Nie et al. (1996) or by Helliwell and Putnam (1999. 
Nevertheless, our further analysis suggests different kinds of patterns that might 
provide more pedagogically cogent explanations than in terms of broad secular trends. 
One is that how people respond to education in a civic sense depends on political 
context. An example was in the contrast in Scotland between voting for the Scottish 
and UK parliaments. It is not just that participation is lower in the former than in the 
latter elections; it is also that the association with education is weaker. A more subtle 
point about the importance of political context emerged from the effects of age on 
attitudes to women’s rights: if age was a surrogate for period of political socialisation, 
then we can say that the apparent effect of holding a degree in making people more 
inclined to support these rights was due not to that education as such but rather to the 
period through which people born after the 1960s have lived. They gained new 
educational opportunities because of the expansion of higher education, and they 
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learned new understandings of gender because that was the major social change of the 
period. These two secular trends may be related in some general way, insofar, for 
example, as being able to gain entry to the professions in greater numbers enabled 
more women to have prominent roles in public life, and this public presence may have 
influenced attitudes towards women’s careers. But the influence of education on 
attitudes to rights was, at most, by that indirect route, not directly at the level of the 
individual, because – in the model – people of similar ages held similar views 
regardless of the amount of education they had had. 
The other reason for variation in the measured effects of education is that the kind 
of education that people have matters. It is possible to have quite a lot of education – 
for example, vocational higher education, or a science degree (Paterson 2009) – and 
yet to have gained nothing in a civic sense from it. Although the main conclusion 
concerning vocational education is that it had little effect, in some instances it was 
associated with views that were less civic as conventionally defined – for example (in 
Table 11) perhaps making people less interested in politics. So any growth of 
vocational education – as strongly urged by policy makers – if it was in place of 
academic education (which it would be almost bound to be) would probably make 
education less relevant to civic values, and may make people less liberal and less 
likely to participate. The longitudinal analysis of panel data (from the BHPS) confirms 
the finding of Feinstein and Hammond (2004) that adult learning of an academic kind 
matters, and suggests that one way in which general intelligence has an impact on 
social trust – as found by Sturgis et al. (2010) – is through academic far more than 
through vocational study.  
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This interaction with educational content ought to be the least surprising 
conclusion to those who study education in detail, and it may be that the tendency to 
generalise about the effects of education on civic life is tempting only if curricula and 
pedagogy are ignored. The matter is more complex than that, however, because it 
seems not to be merely the content of what is offered to students that matters in a civic 
sense but also the manner in which students respond to it. As well as the prior 
research showing the importance of independent thought for civic engagement, there 
is the finding from the data we have examined here that the independent reading of 
books influences people quite consistently to be more active and to hold liberal, 
tolerant and politically engaged views. Independent reading also may incline people to 
the left politically, unlike education in general which tends in the opposite direction. 
Formal education in school is less important in explaining young people’s civic values 
and propensity to participate just after age 18 than the informal influence of their 
parents. 
Thus the conclusion of the analysis may in fact run counter to one likely 
sociological reading of the purposes of the present special issue, the supposition 
which Nieuwbeerta et al. (2000) referred to as the expressive explanation, according 
to which people hold views that reflect their initial socialisation. The evidence we 
have looked at here suggests that matters are not nearly so straightforward. Though it 
is true that, at a fairly young age, family socialisation seems to matter more than 
education, that is not true at older ages. The rising participation of young people in 
higher education in the past thirty years has not led to a constantly rising participation 
in civic life, nor to a steady trajectory towards more liberal views. An important topic 
for further research would then be the manner in which cultural resources acquired in 
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early life, and thus reflecting the norms of a family, are translated later, through 
education, into a capacity for autonomous judgement on civic matters. Such research 
might be designed to extend longitudinally into adult life the careful delineation of 
cultural knowledge that Sullivan (2007) provided for a sample of school students. 
But neither also are the patterns to be readily explained instrumentally, 
Nieuwbeerta et al. (2000)’s second explanation. The tendency of well-educated people 
to hold economically right-wing views might be interperted in that way, insofar as the 
well-educated would tend to benefit personally from less state involvement in the 
economy because of the generally professional class positions that they tend to 
occupy, but no such instrumental explanation readily presents itself for the association 
of higher education with views that are liberal or anti-racist, and with a less cynical 
attitude to politicians. Moreover, the association of reading for pleasure with left-wing 
views would suggest a survival into a much more educated age of the tradition of the 
autodidact socialist (Rose, 2001). 
Thusthe sociological explanation from Nieuwbeerta et al. (2000) that works best 
here is what they call ‘acculturation’, the tendency of people to move towards the 
characteristic views of social groups to which they come to belong. In this 
interpretation, the young absorb the views of their parents only because they are still 
close to them, but, for adults, what matters is how they respond to new social 
contexts. It is then the educational content of learning, and people’s understanding of 
that, which is important in understanding its effect, and a sociological explanation that 
paid no attention to curricular or pedagogical characteristics would not adequately 
capture why education matters. 
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Educational expansion may be good for democracy in that it may encourage the 
well-educated to be civic and to be active. They are equipped to think independently 
and then they take that independent thought into both their own further enlightenment 
and into the roles which they play in social networks. There is no evidence from the 
wide range of British data we have analysed here that these civic effects weaken as 
overall education expands, but neither are they uniform. The main conclusion from 
the analysis is thus that education is not automatically a source of democratic 
enlightenment: as with all the other effects that education may have, its civic effects 
depend on what learners do with it.  
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